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This paper uses tax rebate payments from the 2008 economic stimulus to estimate the 
effect of a one-time change in income on three measures of subjective well-being: life 
satisfaction, health satisfaction, and affect. The income effect is identified by exploiting the 
plausibly exogenous variation in the payment schedule of the rebates. Using both ordinary least 
squares and two-stage least squares estimators, I find that the rebates had a large and positive 
impact on affect, which is explained by a reduction in feelings of stress and worry. For life 
satisfaction and health satisfaction, there is weaker evidence of a positive impact. Overall, the 
results show that a temporary increase in liquidity may enhance emotional well-being and that 
this effect is relatively stronger for low-income respondents.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Over the past 40 years, economists have become more interested in understanding the 
predictors of subjective well-being (SWB). For example, SWB has been used to study the 
welfare trade-off between inflation and unemployment (Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 
2001), welfare costs of business cycles (Wolfers 2003), compensating wage differentials for time 
to commute (Stutzer and Frey 2008) and need to interact with others (Krueger and Schkade 
2008b), gender differences in happiness (Stevenson and Wolfers 2009), mental costs of job loss 
or unemployment (Clark and Oswald 1994; Krueger and Mueller 2011; Kalil and DeLeire 2013), 
and health and disability (Daly and Gardiner 2013; Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo 
2013). However, perhaps the best-known application of SWB in economics has been to answer 
the question “Does more income make you happier?” (Easterlin 1974).1  
This paper contributes to this literature by estimating the effect of income on SWB using 
exogenous variation in the timing of the 2008 economic stimulus tax rebate payments. These 
rebates were one-time, lump-sum payments worth about $1,000 on average that were sent to 
about 130 million households and could be expected to have a pure income effect. Because the 
rebates were disbursed using a close-to-random schedule of payment, the tax rebate program 
offers an attractive setting for identifying the effect of a medium-sized income change on SWB. 
To measure this effect on SWB, I use the Gallup-Healthways Daily Poll (GHDP), a 
Gallup survey started in 2008 that collects information on several measures of subjective well-
being on a day-to-day basis. Specifically, the GHDP collects data on life satisfaction, health 
satisfaction, and information on affect (sometimes called emotional well-being or experienced 
1 DiTella and MacCulloch (2006), Kahneman and Krueger (2006), Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008), and 
Deaton (2008) provide recent literature reviews.  
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utility) as well as demographic variables. During the time that the U.S. Treasury was issuing tax 
rebate payments, the GHDP included a daily question asking the respondents whether they had 
received a tax rebate. To my knowledge, the GHDP is the only survey that collected information 
on both SWB and 2008 tax rebate receipt.  
The exogenous variation in the disbursement of tax rebates is valuable because there is 
disagreement as to whether income increases SWB. Early literature reported only a weak 
association between SWB and income across countries—the “Easterlin paradox” (Easterlin 
1974). This has puzzled economists because utility, purportedly proxied by SWB, is a key 
normative measure in economics and because theory predicts income to be a central determinant 
of well-being; see, for example, Deaton (2008), Kahneman and Deaton (2010), Sacks, 
Stevenson, and Wolfers (2012), and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008, 2013) for recent research on 
this topic.  
Concurrent with the debate over the SWB-income relationship, some economists have 
also taken issue with whether SWB is a meaningful measure of economic well-being (for 
example, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Hamermesh 2004; and McCloskey 2012). This 
skepticism is in part because laboratory experiments have shown that SWB is sensitive to events 
that have nothing to do with actual changes in income; for example, Kahneman and Krueger 
(2006) describe a randomized experiment conducted by Norbert Schwartz (1987) in which a 
dime was placed on top of a photocopy machine. Subjects who found the dime reported a higher 
level of life satisfaction than those who did not. However, other research has also shown that 
objective economic measures—business-cycle volatility, unemployment, and inflation—do 
correlate negatively with SWB, which would validate it as a meaningful measure.  
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The tax rebates offer an attractive natural experiment for estimating the effect of income, 
and several papers have shown that the rebates had a short-term positive causal effect on 
household spending,2 health-care utilization, and personal bankruptcies, but a negative effect on 
payday loans.3 Given that the rebates had a causal effect on actual choices (that is, on revealed 
preference), finding that the rebates also had an effect on SWB (that is, on “stated preference”) 
could be viewed as a way to validate (albeit indirectly) the usefulness of SWB as an economic 
measure. Furthermore, because the rebates were targeted toward low- and middle-income 
families, they can be used to identify the effect of income for a broad group of people. This is 
useful because previous research identifies the causal effect of income on SWB using lottery 
winners, who constitute a specific subset of the population (Lindahl 2005; Gardner and Oswald 
2007; and Apouey and Clark 2014).  
To answer whether the tax rebates had an effect on SWB, I begin by estimating a linear 
model using ordinary least squares (OLS), where I regress the SWB measures on an indicator of 
whether the respondent has received a tax rebate. Because the timing of rebate disbursement was 
close to random, the coefficient on the tax rebate dummy should be an unbiased, consistent 
estimate of the causal effect of a one-time rebate payment that a respondent receives now as 
opposed to later. However, since this key right-hand-side variable is collected through a survey, 
it could be measured with error, which in turn might attenuate the OLS estimate. I address this 
2 See Shapiro and Slemrod (2009), Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod (2010, 2012), Parker et al. (2013), Broda 
and Parker (2014), Kaplan and Violante (2014a, b), and Misra and Surico (2014) for papers studying the spending 
response to the rebates. Shapiro and Slemrod (2003), Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006), Agarwal, Liu, and 
Souleles (2007), Evans and Moore (2011, 2012), and Skiba (2014) study a similar, though less generous, tax rebate 
program from 2001. 
3 See Gross and Tobacman (2014), Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang (2014), Bertrand and Morse (2009), and 
Skiba (2014). Personal bankruptcies increased because the rebates allowed liquidity-constrained households to pay 
administrative fees required to declare bankruptcy. 
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issue by constructing an instrumental variable (IV) and applying the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimator.  
The instrument is constructed using data from Daily Treasury Statements (DTS) on how 
many millions of dollars of rebate payments were issued between late April and August of 2008. 
Specifically, from each DTS report, I calculate the fraction of the rebate-eligible population that 
had been sent a rebate by that day. Using this variable as an instrument, I can correct 
measurement error by instrumenting one quantity potentially measured with error—the survey 
measure of tax rebate receipt—with another measure of that quantity. The DTS data reflect the 
exogenous timing of rebate payments, which is arguably uncorrelated with unobservables in the 
regression error term. As I show, this instrument is a strong predictor of the survey measure of 
rebate receipt.  
There are two main findings. First, the OLS estimates show that rebate receipt had a 
positive effect on all measures of SWB: life satisfaction, health satisfaction, and affect. Second, 
the 2SLS estimates show that rebate receipt increased affect by 0.60 of a standard deviation—a 
substantial gain. This increase comes from a large decrease in the probability that respondents 
experience feelings of stress and worry, which suggests that additional liquidity may temporarily 
improve emotional well-being. Furthermore, the observed increase in affect is stronger for low-
income respondents. However, for the remaining two dependent variables, life satisfaction and 
health satisfaction, the 2SLS estimates turn out to be large but imprecise and sensitive to 
alternative specifications.  
Why did the rebates lead to an observed decrease in stress and worry but had no 
statistically significant effect on life satisfaction or health satisfaction? One possible explanation 
is that rebate payments are too small to change one’s life evaluation or improve one’s health. As 
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Krueger and Schkade (2008a) write, “One’s general level of life satisfaction would be expected 
to change only very slowly over time, because so do most of its known correlates.” Also, 
Gardener and Oswald (2007) show that among lottery winners there was no statistically 
significant effect on self-reported health for lottery wins up to £999, an amount similar to the 
rebates. Affect, on the other hand, measures more immediate feelings of worry or joy, which 
might be sensitive to current or recent events, such as a one-time payment. As Deaton (2011) 
writes, “Affect responds to circumstance, while life evaluation does not.”  
Why does it matter if affect reacts to circumstance? The answer might lie at the 
intersection of psychology and economics. Research in psychology has argued that even small 
income shocks may have surprisingly large effects on cognitive capacity. For example, Mani et 
al. (2013) demonstrate that inducing low-income people to think of financial distress reduces 
their cognitive capacity, and the authors argue that this is because of an increase in worries about 
finances. A link between liquidity constraints and emotional distress may explain why low-
income people sometimes make poor financial decisions (Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2012). 
Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) provide evidence of a positive causal link between affect and 
patience. If affect matters for economic decision making, then affect may have implications for 
policy. I return to these points later in the paper.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the 2008 tax 
rebates. Section III describes the data, and Section IV the empirical strategy. The results are 
presented in Section V and discussed in Section VI. The final section concludes. 
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE 2008 ECONOMIC STIMULUS TAX REBATES 
In 2008, as the United States entered the Great Recession, the Bush administration 
proposed an economic stimulus package that included tax rebates to low- and middle-income 
families with the goal of increasing household spending. The proposal, called the Economic 
Stimulus Act of 2008, was passed in February, and the first payments were issued by late April.  
Eligibility for the tax rebate was determined by the 2007 tax returns.4 However, 
individuals with no net tax liability who had a qualifying income of at least $3,000 per year were 
also eligible to receive the rebate. The tax rebates ranged between $300 and $600 for individual 
tax filers and between $600 and $1,200 for joint filers. The eligibility was phased out at a rate of 
5 percent above the annual income limit of $75,000 ($150,000 for couples). Conditional on 
eligibility, those with a dependent child who qualified for the child tax credit received an 
additional $300 per child. According to Parker et al. (2013), a majority of U.S. households, about 
130 million (or some 85 percent of tax-filing units), were qualified to receive the rebates, and 
almost $100 billion was issued in stimulus payments.  
Parker et al. (2011) report that 30.9 percent of the households in their sample received 
rebates worth $600, followed by 26.2 percent who received rebates worth $1,200. Hence, over 
half of the recipient households received rebates ranging between $600 and $1,200. The third 
most numerous group, 11.2 percent of the households, received $300 in rebate payments; 7 
percent received $1,500; and 6.4 percent received $1,800. The average value of the tax rebate 
payment was about $1,000.  The tax rebate payment schedule depended on the last two digits of 
the filer’s Social Security number (SSN). As these two digits of the SSN are assigned 
4 This section is based on Parker et al. (2013) and information from the Internal Revenue Service found at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120825050232/http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=179095,00.html.  
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sequentially and, in effect, randomly, the timing of when someone received a payment depended 
on an exogenous factor.  
Had the variation in the timing of payment depended only on the SSN, then the process 
of disbursement of the tax rebates would have been a random-assignment experiment in which 
the timing of when someone eligible receives his or her payment is random. However, in 
practice, the payment schedule depended on other nonrandom factors, such as whether the filers 
included direct deposit information with their 2007 tax returns and whether the taxes were filed 
on time. The taxpayers who included direct deposit information received payment on three 
separate occasions in May. Parker et al. (2013) report that about 40 percent of the survey 
respondents answered that they received the rebate electronically. If the information about direct 
deposit was not included, checks were mailed from about mid-May to mid-July. Late tax filers 
received their tax rebate payments a few weeks later than the on-time filers subject to the 
“randomized” schedule. In sum, because of the not-entirely-random aspects of the disbursement 
process, the schedule of the tax rebate payments better fits the description of a quasi-experiment. 
The 2008 tax rebate disbursement is also different from a typical random-assignment 
experiment in the following way. In a typical random-assignment experiment, a treatment group 
receives a treatment, while a control group is never treated. Hence, the treatment effect can be 
obtained by comparing the outcomes of these two groups. Instead, by the end of the rebate 
disbursement, all eligible recipients will receive a rebate. Hence, this paper, as well as the 
existing literature on the effects of rebates, identifies the effect of rebate receipt by comparing 
the outcomes of rebate recipients to the outcomes of people who have not yet received a rebate 
but will.  
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Table 1 shows the payment schedule by SSN and type of deposit. The right-hand column 
shows the dates by which filers who chose direct electronic deposit were intended to receive tax 
rebate payment transfers. The left-hand column shows the dates by which the filers who did not 
use direct deposit were intended to receive their tax rebate payments by mail. May 16 is a 
common date for both methods of delivery.  
Figure 1 shows the daily disbursement of payments reported by the Daily Treasury 
Statements (DTS).5 The payment schedule of the tax rebates is clearly visible in the 11 big 
spikes, which correspond to the dates listed in Table 1. About half of the payments were made on 
May 2, 9, and 16, which were the dates of disbursement for filers with direct deposit.  
Note that some of the disbursement occurred in between the payment schedule dates 
listed in Table 1. This is because the dates listed in Table 1 pertain to the latest date on which a 
recipient would receive the tax rebate. The small “bumps” in late July are likely payments made 
to late tax filers.  
III. DATA 
The data come from two sources: the Gallup-Healthways Daily Poll (GHDP) and the 
daily statements, or DTS, from the U.S. Treasury. The GHDP is conducted daily by telephone 
interviews with a random sample of about 500 to 1,000 individuals aged 18 or older living in the 
United States. Each day a new cross section is drawn, and the survey is conducted seven days a 
week, excluding major holidays. Gallup collects the data using a dual-frame, random-digit 
dialing of both landlines and cell phones. The interviews are conducted with a respondent who is 
18 years of age or older, living in the household, and who had his or her birthday most recently.  
5 I obtain this data from http://www.fms.treas.gov/dts/index.html.  
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A. Tax Rebate Receipt  
Between April 27 and July 1, 2008, and then again between July 21 and 23 of that year, 
Gallup asked about 500 randomly selected respondents per day whether they had received a tax 
rebate.6 The question read, “As part of an economic stimulus package passed by Congress, most 
individuals will receive a rebate check of between $300 and $600 from the federal government. 
These rebates are just starting to be sent to Americans or deposited in their checking accounts. 
Have you personally received this stimulus package rebate from the federal government, or not?” 
The answer is measured as a “yes” or a “no.”  
The survey did not collect information on SSNs or whether the tax rebate was received 
by mail or electronically by direct deposit. However, Parker et al. (2013) did not find that the 
consumption response differed depending on the method of payment delivery, and in their main 
results they pool the tax rebate recipients who submitted direct deposit information with those 
who received their checks by mail. Figure 2 shows the fraction of GHDP respondents reporting 
that they have received the tax rebate.7  
When constructing the GHDP time series in Figure 2, I exclude individuals who report 
having an imputed gross monthly income equal to or more than $6,000. This is because the tax 
rebate question does not unambiguously distinguish between eligible and noneligible 
nonrecipients—that is, the respondents who answer “no” because they had too high an income in 
the previous year and will not receive a tax rebate. I select the $6,000 per month cutoff because it 
is close to the income limit at which the eligibility for the tax rebates was phased out ($75,000 
6 Between April 27 and May 5, about 1,000 respondents were surveyed about the tax rebate question, and 
on June 11 only about 250 respondents were surveyed. Also, the survey was not administered on May 30, June 18, 
and June 27, 2008.  
7 Table A.1 in the appendix shows, day by day, the fraction of GHDP respondents who say they received 
the tax rebates.  
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per year for individual filers and $150,000 per year for couples). I impose the same restriction on 
the regression analysis sample as well.  
In order to impose this restriction, I convert the categorical measure of household gross 
monthly income into a measure of individual-equivalent income in the following way. The 
GHDP asks about total current monthly gross income of the household and collects the data in 10 
bins. I transform this variable into a continuous measure by assigning the value at the midpoint 
of each bin. Then, I infer the number of adults in the household by using information about 
marital status. I create this individual-equivalent measure of monthly income by dividing the 
gross income measure by the square root of the number of adults in the household (two if 
married or living with a partner and one if otherwise).  
B. Validation of the Question on Tax Rebate Receipt 
In order to validate the tax rebate survey question, I compute a comparable measure using 
data from the DTS. The DTS time series is constructed by, for each day, summing the 
cumulative amount of payments issued by that date and dividing it by the total of about $92.185 
billion issued in tax rebate payments by the end of August 2008. This time series shows, day by 
day, the fraction of eligible recipients who have been sent their rebate payment. The pattern 
observed in Figure 2 follows a series of stepwise increments that correspond to the 11 big spikes 
visible in Figure 1. The series also shows that by late July nearly all of the payments had been 
sent.  
Comparing the GHDP series with the DTS series provides visual validation of the GHDP 
question. The GHDP time series is very close to the DTS time series; however, the GHDP series 
generally indicates a lower fraction of tax rebate recipients than the DTS time series. This 
suggests measurement error, the extent of which can be inferred by computing a reliability ratio 
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by regressing the dummy for whether a respondent has received a rebate on the DTS time series; 
see Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), who use this method to validate a years-of-schooling 
variable by correlating two mismeasured variables. In my case, the reliability ratio equals 77 
percent, which means that less than a quarter of the variation in the rebate series is due to 
mismeasurement. The reasons for this measurement error are further discussed in Section IV. To 
correct for measurement error, I use the DTS time series as an instrumental variable for tax 
rebate receipt in GHDP, which is also discussed in Section IV.  
C. Measures of Subjective Well-Being 
I use three GHDP questions measuring different aspects of subjective well-being.  
The first outcome is a life satisfaction “ladder of life” question: “Please imagine a ladder 
with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. The top of the ladder represents 
the best possible life for you, and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for 
you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?” This 
life satisfaction question is measured on an 11-point scale from zero (worst possible) to 10 (best 
possible), which is standardized and reported in “effect sizes.” The benefit of using this 
transformation is that it allows one to estimate linear regression models and to interpret the 
estimated coefficients as standard deviation changes, denoted as σ.  
The second outcome is affect (“Did you experience the following feelings a lot yesterday: 
enjoyment, happiness, physical pain, worry, sadness, stress, anger?”), which is measured as 
either a “yes” or a “no.” “Affect” is sometimes also called emotional well-being or experienced 
utility; see Kahneman and Krueger (2006) and Kahneman and Deaton (2010). Following 
Krueger and Schkade (2008a), I compute net affect by subtracting the average of questions on 
negative affect (physical pain, worry, sadness, stress, anger) from the average of questions on 
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positive affect (enjoyment, happiness). In order to interpret the estimates in terms of effect sizes, 
I also standardize this outcome variable.  
As a third outcome, I use a question about satisfaction with health (“Are you satisfied or 
dissatisfied with your health?”), which takes on one of two values: satisfied or dissatisfied. 
Including this variable allows me to relate the findings to research on the positive gradient 
between income and health.  
As is discussed further in the paper, in order to separate the effect of tax rebate receipt on 
SWB from a general timing effect, it is important to understand how the SWB measures behave 
over time. Due to its size, there are enough observations in the GHDP to show how the mean of 
the three SWB measures fluctuate day by day. Figure 3 shows the time path of the three unscaled 
SWB measures during 2008 and 2011—the two years of GHDP data available to me—for all of 
the GHDP respondents. The shaded area denotes the time window when the tax rebate question 
was asked (that is, from April 27 to July 23).  
Panel A in Figure 3 shows that during 2008, mean life satisfaction was trending down. 
During the time when the tax rebate question was asked, average life satisfaction fluctuated 
between 6.7 and 6.8. For life satisfaction in 2011, the scale is different, because in 2011 
satisfaction with life was overall much higher. Note that in 2011, the data only range from about 
6.9 to about 7.1.  
Panel B shows that mean net affect behaves differently over time than mean life 
satisfaction. Except for an increase around the Fourth of July, it remains relatively constant 
during the period in which the tax rebate question is asked. For net affect, the data range and the 
behavior over time is not as different between 2008 and 2011 as for life satisfaction.  
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Panel C shows the time path of mean health satisfaction (this question was discontinued 
in the latter part of 2008 and so is not reported for 2011). Mean health satisfaction is also 
relatively constant, with about 0.82–0.83 of the sample expressing satisfaction with their health. I 
return to the discussion of the time-series properties of SWB measures in Section V.A, where I 
plot the time series of the three SWB measures separately for rebate recipients and nonrecipients.  
IV. METHODS  
I begin by discussing the OLS estimator and, given the data, its limitations in estimating 
the effect of tax rebate receipt on SWB. In light of these limitations, I then discuss how to correct 
the analysis using a two-stage least squares estimator.  
A. Ordinary Least Squares Estimator 
The tax rebates were distributed among the rebate-eligible population using a quasi-
randomized payment schedule, in which the date on which one received a rebate depended on the 
last two digits of one’s SSN. Hence, the treatment is the receipt of the rebate now as opposed to 
later because, in the end, all eligible recipients will receive a rebate. An ideal comparison group 
for estimating the effect of this treatment would be the future recipients, that is, the respondents 
who, because of the exogenous variation in the timing of rebate disbursement, have not yet 
received the rebate but will. The comparison between the recipients and this comparison group 
could be accomplished by estimating the following model using OLS:  
(1) SWBit = α + δTRit + uit ,  
where i indexes the respondents and t the day when the survey is collected. SWB denotes a 
measure of either life satisfaction, net affect, or health satisfaction; TR equals one if the 
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respondent had received a tax rebate by day t and zero otherwise; u denotes i’s unobservable 
traits. The coefficient of interest is δ, the difference between the SWB of someone who had 
received a rebate by day t and someone who had not (but would in the future).  
The identifying assumption of this model is that whether a respondent has received a 
rebate or not by day t is independent of any individual characteristics: E(u|TR) = 0. If so, the 
OLS estimator of δ is a consistent estimate of the causal effect of the tax rebate receipt on SWB. 
There are, however, reasons why the OLS estimator might not be consistent.  
Given the way the tax rebate question is phrased in the survey, a respondent could say he 
or she had not received a rebate for either of two reasons: a respondent may have been eligible 
for a rebate but due to randomization had not yet received the rebate, or the respondent may have 
been ineligible because of high income in the previous year and would never receive a rebate. 
Including respondents who will never receive a rebate in the comparison group will likely violate 
the identifying assumption E(u|TR) = 0, because these ineligibles differ from recipients in many 
ways, some unobserved. Including individuals who answer “no” because they are ineligible (and 
will never receive the rebate) will lead to understating true proportion of respondents who had 
received a rebate by day t (as evident from Figure 2), and this will attenuate the OLS estimate of 
δ.  
To address this measurement problem, as a first step, I exclude all respondents whose 
individual-equivalent monthly gross income is equal to or exceeds $6,000. As mentioned in 
Section III.A, I choose this cutoff because it is close to the tax rebate phase-out region. Second, I 
account for observable differences between recipients and nonrecipients by including a vector of 
controls, described in the next subsection. Third, I correct the bias in the OLS estimate of δ by 
constructing and applying an instrumental variable (IV). Intuitively, when using the IV technique 
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to identify the effect of rebate receipt on SWB, the identifying variation in TR will consist of the 
variation that can be changed by the instrument. Specifically in this case, to identify the effect of 
rebate receipt on SWB, I need to apply IV to isolate the variation in TR in the sample consisting 
of recipients and future recipients, that is, people who have not yet received the rebate but will. 
Below, I discuss the instrument and its limitations in more detail.  
B. Two-Stage Least Squares Estimator  
In order to construct a valid instrumental variable (IV), one needs a variable that is 
correlated with TR, but not with the regression error, u. Had the data included information on 
SSNs, then these could have been used as instruments for TR. Instead, a coarser IV is 
constructed by using data on tax rebate payments reported by the DTS.  
The rationale for using the DTS data as an instrument is that 1) it only uses the variation 
in TR that is induced by the exogenously determined schedule of payments used by the Treasury 
and hence is plausibly uncorrelated with the regression error term u, and 2) it is a relevant IV, as 
the daily tax rebate payments issued by the Treasury strongly predict the day-by-day likelihood 
of tax rebate receipt.  
Formally, I estimate the model using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator, given by 
the two-equation system (2):  
(2)  SWBit = δTRit + x'itβ + τit + α1w + α2w2 + uit  
TRit = πDTSit + x'itθ + τit + γ1w + γ2w2 + vit ,  
where x is a vector of observables, τ is a vector of day-of-week dummies, w is a weekly time 
trend, DTS denotes the instrumental variable, and u and v are error terms. The instrument is 
constructed in the following way. For each statement from DTS on day t, I calculate the 
cumulative amount of dollars disbursed in rebate payments up to day t and divide this sum by the 
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entire aggregate dollar value of rebate payments made in accordance with the Economic 
Stimulus Act ($92.185 billion). This instrument, shown in Figure 2 as a time series, is the 
fraction of the population eligible for the tax rebates that have been sent a rebate by that day.  
I use this between-day variation in the fraction of (potential) rebate recipients to 
instrument the survey indicator for whether a respondent has received a tax rebate on that day. In 
practice, this approach corrects measurement error by instrumenting the survey measure of 
rebate receipt with an aggregate measure of potential rebate receipt.8  
Since rebate receipt is increasing over time, it is important to control for time trends. All 
of the specifications include a linear and square weekly time trend, w. The regressions also 
control for a vector of day-of-week dummies, τ. To account for observable differences between 
recipients and nonrecipients, I include the vector x, which consists of variables that are likely to 
be fixed with respect to rebate eligibility. The vector x includes a constant, a flexible polynomial 
in age, race/ethnicity indicators, gender, an indicator for whether the respondent is married, 
number of children younger than 18 years who live in the household, the respondent’s highest 
level of educational attainment, and which state the respondent lives in.  
For the main results, I present separate results where I do and do not condition the 
regressions on self-reported current monthly household income. This is because self-reported 
current income might increase mechanically as a result of the tax rebate payment and so could be 
endogenous. As it turns out, controlling for income matters little for the δ-coefficients.  
8 If the data from DTS contain some measurement error, it is likely that the measurement error in DTS and 
the measurement error in the survey are uncorrelated. 
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C. Limitations of the IV Estimator 
A potential downside of using the DTS variable as an IV is that since it is collected at a 
more aggregate level than the survey question, using it as an instrument will result in a loss of 
efficiency in the 2SLS estimate of δ. Because of this problem, when the point estimates are large 
and imprecisely estimated, but robust to specification checks, I interpret the estimates as 
economically large.  However, when the point estimates are large and imprecisely estimated, but 
sensitive to specification checks, I interpret the estimates as only weak evidence.  
Another concern is that when using an IV to instrument a dichotomous variable classified 
with error (as is often the case with survey questions), the IV estimator, δ�IV , is biased upwards 
and is not a consistent estimator of δ; see Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001). In such case, 
the IV estimator is still valuable because it allows one to bound the true effect, which will lie 
between the attenuated OLS estimator and the IV estimator. However, because the variability in 
the GHDP tax rebate measure in Figure 2 is not in excess of what one might expect given the 
sample size, it is not likely that the IV estimator greatly overstates δ.  
D. Effect over Time 
Because of the way the tax rebate question is phrased, I observe whether a respondent has 
received a rebate, but not when he or she received it. Note that although each day a new random 
sample of respondents are interviewed, as time progresses, the likelihood of receiving the rebate 
at an earlier date than the date of the interview increases. Hence, although the likelihood of being 
interviewed regarding rebate receipt does not change over the time the tax rebate question is 
asked, I mechanically observe more tax rebate recipients the further out in time the survey is 
conducted. For example, in May, an average tax rebate recipient would have had the tax rebate 
for about two weeks, and in June, an average recipient would have had the tax rebate for about a 
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month. Therefore, the estimate of δ is an average of current and recent responses, which will 
understate the immediate effect of the tax rebate on SWB if there is a fade-out.  
Early on in the rebate disbursement process, the time gap between when someone is 
interviewed and when that person received the payment is smaller (but so is the number of 
respondents who report receiving the rebate). To see if the results differ, I conduct a separate 
analysis for the first two months of the disbursement, April and May (note that May is the first 
full month of the disbursement).  
V. RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the key variables for the main estimation 
sample using the 2008 GHDP data. On a scale from 0 (worst possible) to 10 (best possible), the 
average life satisfaction equals about 6.4. On average, positive affect dominates over negative 
affect. Finally, about 8 out of 10 respondents are satisfied with their health. These means are 
very similar to the averages reported in Deaton (2008) and Kahneman and Deaton (2010). 
Looking at the descriptive statistics separately by receipt status, Table 2 shows that nonrecipients 
are more likely to be older and nonwhite.9 Recipients are more likely to be married, to have more 
children, to have had at least some college, and to have higher monthly household income. There 
is no statistical difference with respect to gender.  
Some of the differences are consistent with determinants of eligibility for the rebate; for 
example, married respondents might be more likely to respond that they received a rebate 
9 Table 2 also shows that the GHDP tends to oversample older respondents. The survey includes sample 
weights that reweight the sample to match the national distribution in terms of age, gender, region, race, and 
education. Since the aim of the paper is not primarily descriptive, I do not use the sample weights in the analysis, but 
rather control for all of the above observables directly. Repeating the analysis using sample weights does not change 
the main results; these results are available from the author. For a discussion of the use of sample weights in 
regressions, see Deaton (1997), Angrist and Pischke (2009), and Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge (2015).  
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because a spouse has received it. As with many surveys, it is likely that some variables are 
measured with error. Combined, these differences in observable characteristics might bias 
estimates that compare recipients and nonrecipients; this provides a rationale for regression 
adjustment and for using the IV method. As a robustness check, in Section V.D, I also conduct a 
subgroup analysis where I stratify the sample along the observables for which recipients and 
nonrecipients differ.   
A. Differences in SWB among Recipients and Nonrecipients over Time  
To anticipate the main results, Figure 4 presents a time series of unadjusted daily 
averages of each of the three SWB measures in April, May, and June, stratified by whether the 
respondent has received the rebate (denoted by the thick solid line) or not (denoted by the thin 
solid line).10 Each of the graphs also includes two vertical dashed lines. The first line denotes 
May 2, the date by which the first large batch of rebate deposits were made; the second line 
denotes May 16, the date by which the first large batch of rebate checks were sent.  
The aim of showing these time series is to see whether, in the weeks after the rebate 
deposits or checks are made or sent out, there is a change in the time series of SWB of early 
rebate recipients (that is, the recipients in the first weeks of May) versus the SWB of 
nonrecipients. The period to the left and to the right of the first dashed line is particularly 
interesting, as it denotes the beginning of the 2008 tax rebate “natural experiment.” However, 
because the SWB time series presented in Figure 4 are unadjusted with respect to preexisting 
differences between recipients and nonrecipients, it is important to keep in mind that the visual 
10 I omit the last three dates in July as they occur late during the disbursement. By late July, the majority of 
eligibles would have received a rebate.   
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difference in SWB in Figure 4 should not be interpreted as evidence of a causal effect of the 
rebate.  
Starting with Panel A of Figure 4, it appears that the mean life satisfaction of rebate 
nonrecipients is relatively constant, but the mean life satisfaction of recipients first increases, 
then plummets, and then increases again. This behavior of life satisfaction, especially early on in 
the disbursement, is puzzling and (again, anticipating the conclusion), among the three SWB 
measures, the analysis pertaining to life satisfaction turns out to be the least robust.  
Panel B of Figure 4 is different. Before May 2, there appears to be no difference in net 
affect between recipients and nonrecipients. After May 2, the net-affect time series for rebate 
recipients goes up, whereas the net-affect time series for nonrecipients stays relatively flat until 
the end of May and then decreases. The similarity of mean net affect of recipients and 
nonrecipients before May 2 and the later increase in the net affect of recipients early on in the 
disbursement could be consistent with a rebate effect. As I will show later, the estimates 
pertaining to net affect are the most robust estimates in the paper.  
Finally, for health satisfaction, presented in Panel C, we see that recipients report better 
health satisfaction than nonrecipients even before May 2, but, again, this could be due to not 
accounting for group differences in Table 2.  
B. Baseline Results 
In this section, I proceed to estimate the causal effect of tax rebate receipt on SWB. Table 
3 presents estimates of δ. As a way to gauge the extent of bias discussed in the previous section, I 
report estimates using both OLS and 2SLS, with and without controlling for demographics, and 
with and without controlling for household income dummies. For each of the three outcome 
variables—life satisfaction, net affect, and health satisfaction—the coefficients in the odd-
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numbered columns show the OLS estimates of the effect of the tax rebate. Column (1) only 
controls for time trends and day-of-week dummies; column (3) additionally controls for 
demographics, and column (5) additionally controls for a vector of gross monthly household 
income dummies. Each even-numbered 2SLS column uses the same set of controls as the 
preceding odd-numbered OLS column but instruments the tax rebate dummy with the DTS 
instrument.  
The OLS estimates show a small increase of about 0.05σ in life satisfaction, which 
decreases to about 0.02σ and loses precision once I control for income. In all odd-numbered 
columns, the OLS effect on net affect remains robust and precisely estimated at about 0.09–
0.11σ. When using health satisfaction as an outcome, the probability of reporting satisfaction 
with health goes up by 0.01–0.03 and is significant at least at the 10 percent level.  
The loss of precision of some of the OLS estimates is relevant because the OLS estimates 
can be thought of as a lower bound of the effect of the rebate, especially if the corresponding 
2SLS point estimate is sizable but imprecise. From Table 3, it appears that only the OLS estimate 
using net affect as the outcome variable remains precise at a 5 percent significance level.  
Turning to the 2SLS estimates, Table 3 shows that the estimates are greater in absolute 
value than the OLS estimates, which suggests that the OLS estimates are attenuated. The 2SLS 
point estimates show a 0.3σ increase in life satisfaction, a 0.6σ increase in net affect, and a 17–19 
percentage point increase in health satisfaction. These point estimates are large; however, the 
2SLS estimates are less efficient, and only the increase in net affect is statistically significant at a 
10 percent significance level in all of the specifications. Below the 2SLS estimates, Table 3 
shows the estimated π-coefficients from the 2SLS models in Equation (2) and F-test statistics of 
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the excluded DTS instrument.11 The magnitude of the F-statistic is about 40, which is well above 
the Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) “rule-of-thumb” value of 10, making it a relevant 
instrument.  
Table 4 complements Table 3 by showing robustness checks of the main results from 
Table 3. Row A in Panel A once again shows the OLS estimates from Table 3, column (5). 
These OLS estimates are included here to serve as a benchmark for the falsification tests 
conducted in Section V. Row B once again presents the 2SLS estimates from Table 3, column 
(6) and these 2SLS estimates serve as a benchmark for the robustness checks described in the 
paragraph below. Row C presents the reduced-form regressions of the 2SLS model from Table 3, 
column (6). The reduced-form regression is obtained by regressing each of the three SWB 
measures directly on the instrumental variable DTS, demographic variables, household income 
dummies, and time effects. The reduced-form estimates echo the 2SLS estimates in the sense that 
the reduced-form coefficient is only statistically significant when using net affect as an outcome 
variable.  
In Table 4, Panel B, I examine how robust the main 2SLS results from Panel A, row B 
are to different specifications of the dependent variables. First, I use the whole year of the 2008 
GHDP survey to net out the time trends from each of the three measures of SWB. The rationale 
for this specification check is to strengthen the claim that the results identify the effect of tax 
rebate receipt as opposed to a general time effect on SWB. First, using data for the year 2008, I 
regress each of the three measures of SWB on a full set of 52 week-of-year dummies and seven 
day-of-week dummies and save the residuals. Then, I use these residuals as outcome variables in 
the 2SLS model from Equation (2). This specification nets out the time trends in SWB across the 
11 Table A.2, in the appendix, reports other coefficients from the first-stage regressions. 
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entire year (as well as within-week variation in SWB), as opposed to holding constant the time 
effects observed only during the observation window when the tax rebate question was asked. 
Table 4, Panel B, row A presents the δ-coefficients from estimating Equation (2) on this 
residualized outcome (see “robustness check 1”).  
Second, I append the 2011 GHDP data to the 2008 data and regress life satisfaction and 
net affect (the health satisfaction question was not asked in 2011) on a full set of 52 week-of-
year dummies, seven day-of-week dummies, and year dummies and also save the residuals. 
Then, I use these residuals as outcome variables in the 2SLS model from Equation (2). Because I 
use two years of data, this specification nets out the predictable seasonal variation in life 
satisfaction and net affect. Panel B, row B in Table 4 presents the δ-coefficients from estimating 
Equation (2) on this residualized outcome (see “robustness check 2”).  
In comparing the results in rows A and B of Panel B in Table 4 to the main 2SLS results 
in the upper panel, two points are worth making. First, when using net affect as the outcome 
variable, the estimated δ-coefficients remain robust at about 0.6σ. Second, when using life 
satisfaction, the estimated δ-coefficients in rows A and B are more sensitive to alternative 
specifications regarding time trends and seasonality. The lack of 2011 data on health satisfaction 
limits what can be said about seasonality effects for this outcome.  
Finally, in Table 4, Panel B, row C, I conduct a placebo test of the reduced-form 
estimates. Specifically, I assign the 2008 DTS payments to the same dates in the 2011 GHDP 
data set and estimate a reduced-form regression for the 2011 life satisfaction and 2011 net 
affect.12 Since there was no rebate disbursement in 2011, the aim of this regression is to show 
12 In the 2008 GHDP data, the category “Hispanic” was one of the five mutually exclusive race/ethnicity 
categories. The 2011 GHDP uses different categories, so that “Hispanic” is not a mutually exclusive category with 
respect to race. Hence, the race/ethnicity indicators are not directly comparable across 2008 and 2011 data; however, 
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that the 2011 reduced-form estimates are small and imprecise, so as to strengthen the argument 
that the 2008 reduced-form estimates show the effect of rebates. Row C shows that, for the 
regression using net affect as an outcome variable, the point estimate is small and imprecise.13 
For life satisfaction, the point estimate is comparable in absolute size to the 2008 reduced-form 
estimate, but is negative and insignificant.  
Since the only δ-coefficients always precisely and robustly estimated are the ones in the 
regressions that use net affect as the dependent variable, in order to see whether anything can be 
learned from how the seven components of net affect react to the rebates, Table 5 shows the 
estimates of δ using each emotion (enjoyment, happiness, pain, worry, sadness, stress, anger) as 
a separate binary outcome variable. Table 5 presents point estimates obtained using OLS linear 
probability models and 2SLS, where each 2SLS estimate is shown below the OLS estimate. All 
of the regressions in Table 5 control for demographic variables and, as with Table 3, the table 
reports estimates from regressions that control for income dummies and for those that do not.  
The OLS estimates suggest that receiving the tax rebate increased feelings of enjoyment 
and happiness and decreased daily feelings of pain, worry, sadness, stress, and anger. Turning to 
the 2SLS estimates, Table 5 shows that, relative to the baseline, all of the estimates are large; 
however, the increase in net affect in Table 3 is driven by the statistically significant decrease in 
the probability of reporting feelings of worry and stress by about 40 percentage points from a 
base of about 30 percent. This is a very large decrease, and this result is robust whether I control 
for household income dummies or not.  
I control for them in the 2011 regressions. The results are virtually identical if I reestimate the 2008 and 2011 
regressions without controlling for race/ethnicity.  
13 I randomly split the 2011 data in half, so that the sample equals on average 500 respondents per day. I 
keep data for the same period for which the 2008 rebate data was collected: April 27–July 1 and July 21–July 23, 
2011. 
24 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
C. Effects in April and May 
Table 6 shows the point estimates of δ where the sample has been restricted to April and 
May, which incurs a loss of about 6,700 observations.  
By and large, the OLS point estimates in Table 6 are similar to the OLS estimates 
reported in Table 3, which is estimated using the entire sample. With the exception of 
regressions using life satisfaction as an outcome variable, for which in column (4) the 2SLS 
point estimate is smaller than the preceding OLS point estimate, the 2SLS estimates of δ are 
greater than the OLS estimates. The 2SLS estimates in Table 6, are, however, smaller than the 
2SLS estimates in Table 3 and never precisely estimated.  
One reason why all of the point estimates are less precise could be that only 17 percent of 
the survey respondents in this restricted sample report that they received a rebate. The F-statistic 
test for weak instruments in Table 6 indicates that the instrument is about 30 and hence still 
relevant, but lower than the F-statistic used for the entire sample.  
In addition to remarking on the lower precision, it is worth commenting on why the 
estimates are generally smaller than those reported in Table 3. If we believe that the effects 
should be stronger earlier on in the disbursement process, then we would expect the coefficients 
in April and May to be larger in absolute size than in Table 3 and this is not the case. However, 
the fact that the April and May regressions using life satisfaction as an outcome variable yield 
smaller and less precise estimates could result from the puzzling behavior of life satisfaction 
reported in Figure 4, which indicates that life satisfaction of recipients decreased after the 
rebates were sent. If so, then the results for life satisfaction estimated using the entire sample 
(reported in Table 3) are driven by the weaker identification that occurs in June and July and 
should be regarded as less convincing. On the other hand, the 2SLS coefficients on regressions 
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using net affect and health satisfaction as outcomes are also smaller, which is puzzling. 
Fortunately, for net affect, we can obtain a better understanding by looking at the effect of rebate 
receipt on the separate components of affect in April and May. 
To do so, Table 7 repeats the analysis from Table 5 using the sample restricted to April 
and May. For stress and worry, both the OLS and 2SLS δ-coefficients are greater in absolute 
value than the corresponding OLS and 2SLS coefficients estimated using the overall sample in 
Table 5. For example, the 2SLS probability of reporting worry goes down by about 45 
percentage points in Table 7, but in Table 5 it goes down by 40 percentage points. In Table 7, the 
2SLS likelihood of reporting stress goes down by about 64 percentage points, but in Table 5 it 
goes down by 40 percentage points. This suggests that the reduction in negative feelings is 
stronger early on, but also that the fade-out of the effect is slow.  
Compared to Table 5, the 2SLS δ-coefficients in Table 7 that use outcomes other than 
stress, worry, or sadness are either less negative (see anger and pain) or turn from positive to 
negative (see enjoyment and happiness). However, only the 2SLS δ-coefficients using stress or 
worry as outcomes are statistically different from zero. One speculation as to why we observe a 
decrease in positive affect is that this reaction is specific to the economic environment of 2008. 
Since the rebates were a part of the economic stimulus, they might have been a reminder of 
uncertain economic prospects, and although they alleviated stress and worry, they might have 
decreased positive affect as well. Because the δ-coefficients from models using negative affect as 
an outcome are more negative in April and May (in particular stress, worry, and sadness) but the 
δ-coefficients from models using positive affect as an outcome are also negative, together this 
contributes to the impact on net affect becoming marginally smaller. Hence, Table 7 
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demonstrates that, compared to positive affect, liquidity might have an asymmetrically stronger 
impact on negative affect.  
D. Subsample Analysis 
In this subsection, I begin by examining how robust the main 2SLS results in Table 3, 
column (6), are to alternative assumptions regarding the imputed income cutoff. Previous 
research (see Misra and Surico 2014) finds that the effect of the tax rebates on spending is 
relatively stronger for low-income groups; hence, one might expect the SWB of lower-income 
individuals to be more sensitive to income.  
Rows A and B in Table 8 show the 2SLS δ-coefficients estimated using analysis samples 
defined by two different individual-equivalent income cutoffs: below or above $2,000 (but less 
than $6,000) in gross monthly income.  When comparing the results in rows A in Table 8 to the 
main 2SLS results in column (6) of Table 3, it is worth noting that, when restricting the sample 
to relatively lower-income respondents, the estimated δ-coefficients are more positive than the 
corresponding estimates in Table 3. The point estimate is statistically significant for the model 
using net affect as an outcome, whereas the δ-coefficients on the other two outcome variables are 
large but not precisely estimated.14 In row B, the estimation sample includes higher-income 
respondents, and the F-statistic is above 30 but, even for net affect, not statistically different 
from zero. Overall, the finding that lower-income respondents react more strongly to the rebates 
suggests the presence of binding liquidity constraints, although this test is only indirect.  
As discussed previously, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that recipients and 
nonrecipients differ not only in terms of income but also in terms of age, race, marital status, 
14 The analysis sample used in row A is smaller and so the F-statistic from the F-test of weak instruments is 
close to the “rule-of-thumb” value of 10, which may put into question how informative these estimates are.  
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number of children, and educational attainment. Rows C through N in Table 8 check the 
sensitivity of the main 2SLS estimates in Table 3 to sample cuts along these characteristics. 
Hence, in row C of Table 8, I begin by restricting the sample to respondents that do not have 
children living with them in the household and reestimate the main 2SLS specifications from 
Table 3 for all three measures of SWB. Below, in row D, I do the same for respondents that have 
children, etc.  
The following insights emerge. The δ-point estimates in rows C–N in Table 8 are only 
stable when using net affect as an outcome variable, whereas for life and health satisfaction, the 
coefficients are sensitive to sample cuts. For example, when using net affect as an outcome 
variable, for both men and women, the δ-coefficients are estimated to be about 0.6σ, although the 
estimates are not precise. If one compares the same rows to the estimates that use life satisfaction 
or health satisfaction as outcomes, one can see that the latter are often large but sensitive. In 
conclusion, only when I use net affect as the dependent variable are the estimated δ-coefficients 
robust to alternative specifications.  
In Table 9, I present 2SLS estimates of δ from additional two-way sample cuts. First, I 
use the cutoff of whether individual-equivalent gross monthly income is below or above $2,000 
(but less than $6,000). Second, for each income cutoff, I additionally stratify the sample by the 
same demographic indicators as used in Table 8.  
Holding a respondent’s characteristics fixed and comparing the δ-coefficients across the 
two panels, it is clear that the δ-coefficients are greater in absolute value for lower-income 
households: in panel A, δ is estimated to be around 2σ, while in panel B, δ is estimated often to 
be below 1σ and is never precise. Within each panel, the δ-coefficients are qualitatively very 
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similar; there are, however, two exceptions: in panel A, the estimates for the subgroups carrying 
the labels “is not white” and “is not married” are outliers with respect to the low IV F-statistics.15 
E. Falsification Tests: False Outcomes and Randomized Placebo Tests 
In this section, I conduct falsification tests of the proposed IV identification strategy. To 
do this, I use the demographic controls from Table 2 as “false outcomes” and reestimate the 
2SLS model separately for each false outcome. The idea is that after I instrument tax rebate 
receipt, the rebates should not show a statistically significant “effect” on these outcomes.  
The false-outcome analysis consists of 72 regressions using the following outcomes: each 
of the 50 states, each of the seven household income dummies, each of the five education-level 
dummies, each of the four race/ethnicity indicators, gender, an indicator for whether a person is 
married, an indicator for whether there are any children in the household, the number of children, 
an indicator for whether the respondent is 35 years or older, and the respondent’s age in years.16 
All of the regressions control for day-of-week dummies and a linear and squared weekly trend. 
Figure 5 graphs the distribution of the p-values of the estimated “effect” of tax rebates on each of 
these false outcomes. The figure also shows the p-values associated with the 2SLS δ-coefficients 
from Table 3, column (2), which control for the same time effects as the false outcome 
regressions.  
Figure 5 shows that the p-values associated with the estimated δ-coefficients on the false 
outcomes are smaller than 0.10 three times out of 72. These statistically significant “effects” 
occurred when estimating regressions that use the following outcome variables: an indicator for 
15 Note that in panel A, the IV F-statistic is greater than 10 in only one case (“is married”). 
16 For categorical outcome variables, I always omit one category. For example, in the regressions using 
each state as an outcome variable, I omit the District of Columbia; for the income category regressions, I omit the 
highest income category; etc.  
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living in Connecticut (p-value = 0.03), an indicator for living in Kentucky (p-value = 0.05), and 
an indicator for the respondent being white (p-value = 0.05).  
As a final falsification test, I conduct placebo randomization tests. To do this, I use a 
random-number generator to reassign tax rebate receipt at random, and then, conditional on the 
observables x and time effects, I reestimate the effect of the placebo receipt on SWB. First, for 
each respondent in my estimation sample, I randomly generate a number between zero and one. 
Second, I create a placebo rebate receipt dummy variable that equals one if, on day t, this random 
number is less than the mean value of the DTS tax rebate receipt on day t and zero otherwise. 
Hence, on any given day, the mean value of the placebo rebate receipt dummy has the same 
value as the mean value of the “true” DTS measure on that day. I repeat this procedure 1,000 
times and record the values of the placebo δ-coefficients. I do this for the 2008 analysis sample 
as well as for data from 2011. For 2011, I randomly split the data in half, so that the sample 
equals on average 500 respondents per day. The estimates from this model correspond the closest 
to the OLS δ-coefficients from Table 4, Panel A, row A, which, as argued in Section V.B, can be 
thought of as a lower bound of the effect.  
Figure 6 graphs the distribution of these placebo δ-coefficients using life satisfaction (in 
Panel A), net affect (in Panel B), and health satisfaction (in Panel C) as outcome variables for the 
years 2008 and 2011. For each outcome, the dashed vertical line corresponds to the OLS δ-
coefficient from Table 4, Panel A, row A. Note that the health satisfaction question was 
discontinued in the latter part of 2008 and was not asked in 2011; therefore, the placebo analysis 
is only done for 2008.  
Figure 6 shows that the distribution of placebo δ-coefficients is centered at zero. The 
results from Figure 6 echo the results from Table 4, Panel A, row A in that the simulated 
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distribution excludes these OLS δ-coefficients for the model using net affect as an outcome, but 
not for the model using life satisfaction. That the simulated distribution of δ-coefficients for life 
satisfaction in 2011 does not exclude the life satisfaction OLS δ-coefficient could reflect the 
findings from Table 4, where the 2011 reduced-form estimate in the model of life satisfaction 
was sizable. In conclusion, the falsification tests suggest that the IV identification strategy is 
sound and the 2SLS estimator is useful in identifying the effect of tax rebate receipt on net affect.  
VI. DISCUSSION  
The most robust result of the paper is that tax rebate receipt increased net affect by 
between 0.1σ (estimated by OLS) and 0.6σ (estimated by 2SLS) and that this increase is due to a 
decrease in stress and worry. For the remaining outcome variables, life satisfaction and health 
satisfaction, although the δ-coefficients estimated using 2SLS are often large, they are not robust 
and are mostly imprecise. Therefore, in subsection A, I discuss the economic meaning of the 
increase in affect. In subsection B, I discuss the mechanism behind the increase in affect and 
policy implications.  
A. Interpretation of Effect Sizes 
To gauge the size of the impact on net affect, consider first Lindahl (2005), who finds 
that the index of self-assessed health increases by 0.037–0.045σ for lottery winners who, on 
average, won about $550 per win and year.17 In comparison, a point estimate in the range of 0.1–
0.6σ represents a large increase. Second, in order to place my estimate in a different context, 
consider that in my sample, the net affect of married respondents is about 0.20σ higher than the 
17 As I am not aware of studies using exogenous variation in income to study its impact on affect, I relate 
these findings to papers looking at the effect of income on self-reported health, which is a strong correlate of SWB.  
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net affect of respondents who are not married (not shown).18 Taken at face value, this suggests 
that a one-time payment of about $600–$1,200 buys more emotional well-being than marriage.  
At least one reason why my point estimate is large is that the responses are measured 
shortly after the respondent received the rebate. In contrast, Lindahl’s data on self-reported 
health is collected years after the respondent had won the lottery. By the same token, the positive 
association between affect and marriage is typically greater earlier in a relationship, whereas I 
observe a lower, “steady-state” marriage-affect premium.19  
B. Discussion of the Main Results and Policy Implications  
The results show that the rebates improved affect and that this estimated effect is stronger 
for low-income than for high-income respondents. Through what mechanisms might this 
improvement have occurred? One possibility is that the rebates led to increased consumption 
spending (see the citations in footnote 2), which in turn improved affect. But according to 
(Parker et al. 2013), households consumed only 12–30 percent of their rebates on average, and it 
seems unlikely that the estimated improvement in affect could be explained entirely by such a 
small increase in consumption.20  
Another possibility is that rebate receipt had a direct impact on affect. Research has 
shown that merely inducing people to think about money can have immediate behavioral 
consequences, possibly because thinking about money causes a change in their emotional well-
being (Mani et al. 2013). Hence, perhaps simply receiving the rebate alleviated stress and worry 
18 Krueger et al. (2009) list marriage as a robust correlate of SWB. The meta-analysis conducted by 
Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener (2005) shows that 0.20 is a typical effect-size estimate of the marriage-affect 
premium.  
19 Rather than affect, Stutzer and Frey (2006) study life satisfaction as a function of length of marriage and 
show that it peaks at the time of marriage.  
20 DeLeire and Kalil (2010) estimate that an additional $10,000 in (leisure) spending increases SWB by 
only 0.14σ. 
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even if the recipients did not utilize most of the payment. Regardless of the mechanism behind 
the rebates’ influence on affect, it is presumably temporary, and one might ask why these results 
matter.  
Fluctuations in affect can have implications for economic decision making. For example, 
using a random-assignment laboratory experiment, Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) show that 
positive affect has a causal effect on patience. Finding that positive affect impacts time 
preferences has implications for policy pertaining to low-income populations. For example, 
welfare recipients have been shown to be relatively present-biased; see, for example, Shapiro 
(2005) for a study of the consumption-smoothing behavior of food stamp recipients, and 
Mastrobuoni and Weinberg (2009) for similar evidence focusing on low-income Social Security 
recipients. Both of these papers conclude that the behavior of the populations they study is either 
consistent with extreme impatience or with a model of hyperbolic discounting. Given these 
findings, a welfare-improving policy would either increase the frequency of benefit payments or 
would consider policies that increase the patience of benefit recipients.  
If policymakers are interested in increasing the patience of benefit recipients by 
improving affect, then more research is needed to understand what determines affect and, in turn, 
how affect impacts behavior. Ifcher and Zarghamee’s (2011) research on the link between affect 
and patience is related to the literature on how affect can impact economic decision making in 
general. Recent work in behavioral economics has argued that, for low-income people, binding 
liquidity constraints may perpetuate distress and limit the capacity of individuals to make 
informed economic decisions. For example, Mani et al. (2013) show that experimentally 
inducing low-income people to think about a hypothetical financial problem leads to a decrease 
in their cognitive abilities. Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) discuss the results of this study and 
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draw broader implications for the effects of liquidity constraints. The authors hypothesize that 
reminding low-income subjects about money matters may reduce their cognitive capacity 
because it increases distress (p. 63), which in turn limits the subject’s capacity for processing 
problems. Support for this is also echoed in other psychological research. Isen (2001) states in 
her literature review that “positive affect enhances problem solving and decision making.”21  
If relaxing liquidity constraints increases affect, and if this increase in affect can in turn 
improve economic decision making, then the estimates suggest that the rebates may have had an 
as yet unaccounted-for benefit. An extension of this research would be to examine the effects of 
policies such as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or the Earned Income Tax Credit 
on affect. Future research should also focus on gaining a better understanding of the mechanisms 
that generate the interdependency between income, affect, and economic behavior.  
VII. CONCLUSION  
This paper uses the 2008 tax rebate payments to estimate the causal effect of a one-time, 
medium-sized change in income on subjective well-being, measured by questions on satisfaction 
with life and health as well as questions on affect/emotional well-being. In order to estimate this 
effect, I use the exogenous timing of tax rebate disbursement, which depends on the last two 
digits in the tax filer’s Social Security number. The randomized schedule of the rebate payments 
allows me to estimate the causal effect of receiving a payment now as opposed to later.  
21 Another conceivable mechanism is that additional liquidity might make people engage in risky 
behaviors, such as more drinking and smoking; see Mullainathan and Shafir (2013, Chapter 3) and Apouey and 
Clark (2014). At the extreme, income shocks have been shown to increase mortality, especially because of substance 
abuse; see Evans and Moore (2011, 2012). Since GHDP includes data on self-reported smoking, I reestimated the 
main model for self-reported smokers; however, this analysis did not suggest that smokers were driving the main 
results. 
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I estimate this effect on subjective well-being using both ordinary least squares and two-
stage least squares methods, where the latter only uses exogenous variation in the schedule of tax 
rebate disbursement. Using the preferred two-stage least squares estimator, I find that the rebates 
increased affect by 0.60 of a standard deviation, which is a large gain. This increase is due to a 
statistically significant and large decrease in stress and worry. The increase in affect is stronger 
for low-income people. On the other hand, the estimated effects on satisfaction with life and 
satisfaction with health are positive and sizable, but not statistically different from zero when 
estimated using the two-stage least squares estimator, and not robust to alternative specifications.  
That the tax rebates had an impact on reducing stress and worry is interesting because 
research in behavioral economics has argued that better emotional well-being, at least in the 
short run, can increase patience, improve the short-run ability to make informed economic 
decisions, and strengthen cognitive capacity. Interestingly, low-income people in particular seem 
to benefit from better emotional well-being. An interesting question for future research is how 
long these positive effects of improved emotional well-being last. Another extension, which 
given the data limitations is beyond the scope of this research, should study more fully the 
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Table 1  Payment Schedule of the 2008 Tax Rebates 
Last two digits of SSN Tax rebate check received by  Last two digits of SSN Tax rebate deposit made by 
     00–09 May 16  00–20 May 2 
10–18 May 23    
19–25 May 30  21–75 May 9 
26–38 June 6    
39–51 June 13    
52–63 June 20    
64–75 June 27    
76–87 July 4  76–99 May 16 
88–99 July 11    
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Table 2  Mean (and Standard Deviation) of Characteristics of the Sample 
 
Received tax rebate?  
  
Received tax rebate?  
Variable All Yes No 
 
Variable All Yes No 
Subjective well-being 
    
Highest completed level of education 
Life satisfaction 6.44 6.49 6.42 
 
Less than high school diploma 0.06 0.04 0.07 
 
(2.08) (1.96) (2.13) 
 
High school degree or diploma 0.24 0.23 0.24 
Net affecta 0.52 0.54 0.50 
 
Technical/vocational school 0.09 0.08 0.09 
 
(0.40) (0.39) (0.41) 
 
Some college 0.27 0.28 0.27 
Enjoyment 0.85 0.86 0.84 
 
College graduate 0.20 0.23 0.19 
Happiness 0.88 0.90 0.88 
 
Postgraduate work or degree 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Pain 0.26 0.23 0.27 
     Worry 0.30 0.28 0.31 
 
Regionb 
Sadness 0.18 0.15 0.19 
 
East 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Stress 0.36 0.35 0.37 
 
Midwest 0.24 0.26 0.22 
Anger 0.12 0.12 0.13 
 
South 0.31 0.30 0.31 
     
West 0.24 0.22 0.25 
Health satisfaction 0.80 0.82 0.79 
     
     
Gross monthly household income (in percent) 
Received tax rebate 0.32 1.00 0.00 
 
Under $60 0.24 0.14 0.29 
Age 53.20 51.54 53.98 
 
$60 to $499 1.52 1.02 1.76 
 
(16.96) (16.23) (17.23) 
 
$500 to $999 7.28 5.00 8.34 
No. of children < 18 years 0.60 0.66 0.57 
 
$1,000 to $1,999 18.94 15.57 20.51 
 
(1.08) (1.08) (1.08) 
 
$2,000 to $2,999 19.67 18.52 20.20 
Married 0.54 0.60 0.52 
 
$3,000 to $3,999 17.28 18.64 16.65 
Woman 0.52 0.52 0.53 
 
$4,000 to $4,999 15.14 16.94 14.30 
     
$5,000 to $7,499 19.94 24.17 17.96 
Race/ethnicity 
        Other  0.04 0.03 0.05 
     White 0.84 0.87 0.82 
     African-American/Black 0.08 0.06 0.08 
     Hispanic 0.03 0.02 0.04 
     Asian 0.01 0.01 0.01 
         Observations 17,933 5,702 12,231 
     NOTE: Author's calculations from the Gallup-Healthways Daily Poll. Universe: Imputed individual-equivalent gross monthly income of less than $6,000; April 27–July 1; July 
21–23, 2008.  
a. Defined as the average positive affect (enjoyment; happiness) minus average negative affect (physical pain; worry; sadness; stress; anger).  
b. In the regression analysis, I control for the state where the respondent lives. Here, because of space considerations, I present regions.  
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Table 3  Estimated Effects of Tax Rebate Receipt on Subjective Well-Being 
Outcome variable Life satisfaction 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Covariates 
      Received tax rebatea 0.055*** 0.316 0.051*** 0.302 0.023 0.317 
 
(0.017) (0.379) (0.017) (0.359) (0.017) (0.356) 
       Time controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household income dummies? No No No No Yes Yes 
       Outcome variable Net affect 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Covariates 
      Received tax rebatea 0.119*** 0.664* 0.118*** 0.627* 0.092*** 0.638* 
 
(0.018) (0.381) (0.018) (0.363) (0.017) (0.361) 
       Time controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household income dummies? No No No No Yes Yes 
       Outcome variable Health satisfaction 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Covariates 
      Received tax rebatea 0.034*** 0.194 0.021*** 0.168 0.012* 0.173 
 
(0.007) (0.154) (0.007) (0.148) (0.007) (0.148) 
       Time controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household income dummies? No No No No Yes Yes 
       First stage regression Received tax rebate 




















       Observations 17,933 17,933 17,933 17,933 17,933 17,933 
NOTE: Universe: Imputed individual-equivalent gross monthly income less than $6,000; April 27–July 1; July 21–23, 2008. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1).  
a. Each column labeled OLS shows the estimate of δ from Equation (1), and each column labeled 2SLS shows the estimate of 
δ from Equation (2). All of the regressions control for day-of-week dummies and a linear and squared weekly trend. Selected 
regressions control for demographics (age, age squared, age cubed, race/ethnicity, gender, number of children less than 18 years, 
an indicator for whether the respondent is married, highest completed level of education, and the state where the respondent 
lives) and monthly household gross income dummies.  
b. The instrumental variable, DTS, is the amount of cumulative tax rebate payments issued by the U.S. Treasury up to a given 




Table 4  Robustness Checks of the Main Results  
PANEL A: OLS and 2SLS effects of tax rebate receipt and reduced-form estimates 
Outcome variable Life satisfaction Net affect Health satisfaction 
    
A. OLS estimates, year 2008 0.023 0.092*** 0.012* 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.007) 
B. 2SLS estimates, year 2008 (main estimates) 0.317 0.638* 0.173 
 (0.356) (0.361) (0.148) 
C. Reduced-form estimates, year 2008 0.167 0.336* 0.091 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.077) 
    
NOTE to PANEL A: Universe: see notes to Table 3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 
0.1). Each cell in rows A–C corresponds to a different regression. Row A replicates the OLS estimate of δ from Table 3, column 
(5), and Row B replicates the 2SLS estimate of δ from Table 3, column (6). Row C shows the reduced-form estimates from the 
2SLS model in Equation (2). All of the regressions control for day-of-week dummies, a linear and squared weekly trend, 
demographics listed in the notes to Table 3, and monthly gross household income dummies. The instrumental variable, DTS, is the 
amount of cumulative tax rebate payments issued by the U.S. Treasury up to a given day, divided by all tax rebate payments made 
in 2008. The F-test statistic, from an F-test of weak identification, equals 45.23. 
    
PANEL B: Robustness checks of 2SLS effects of tax rebate receipt and placebo reduced-form estimates 
Outcome variable Life satisfaction Net affect Health satisfaction 
    
A. 2SLS, week-of-year dummies netted out, year 2008 







B. 2SLS, week-of-year dummies netted out, years 2008 













    
NOTE to PANEL B: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1). Each cell in rows A–C 
corresponds to a different regression. All of the regressions control for day-of-week dummies, a linear and squared weekly trend, 
demographics listed in the notes to Table 3, and monthly household income dummies. Row A uses outcome variables that have 
been residualized with respect to a full year of 52 week-of-year dummies for year 2008 and day-of-week dummies. Row B uses 
outcome variables that have been residualized with respect to a full year of 52 week-of-year dummies for years 2008 and 2011, 
day-of-week dummies, and year dummies. Note that data for health satisfaction was only collected in 2008; hence for health 
satisfaction, rows A and B are the same. The instrumental variable, DTS, is the amount of cumulative tax rebate payments issued 
by the U.S. Treasury up to a given day, divided by all tax rebate payments made in 2008. The F-test statistic from an F-test of 
weak identification equals 45.23. Row C shows the reduced-form estimates from the 2SLS model in Equation (2), where the 2008 




Table 5  Estimated Effects of Tax Rebate Receipt on Components of Daily Affect 
   
Regression controls for income? 
Outcome variable Method  No
a  Yes
b 
















































































 NOTE: Universe: Imputed individual-equivalent gross monthly income of less than $6,000, April 27–July 1; July 21–23, 2008. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1). 
a. Each row labeled OLS shows the estimate of δ from Equation (1), and each row labeled 2SLS shows the estimate of δ from 
Equation (2). All of the regressions control for day-of-week dummies and a linear and squared weekly trend. All of the 
regressions control for demographics listed in the notes to Table 3.  
b. Same as a., but regressions also control for monthly household gross income dummies.  
c. The instrumental variable, DTS, is the amount of cumulative tax rebate payments issued by the U.S. Treasury up to a given 





Table 6  Estimated Effects of Tax Rebate Receipt on Subjective Well-Being in April and May 
Outcome variable Life satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Covariates       
Received tax rebatea 0.054** 0.197 0.057** 0.020 0.032 0.078 
 (0.027) (0.552) (0.027) (0.557) (0.026) (0.544) 
       Time controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household income dummies? No No No No Yes Yes 
       Outcome variable Net affect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Covariates       
Received tax rebatea 0.100*** 0.654 0.110*** 0.512 0.091*** 0.572 
 (0.026) (0.549) (0.026) (0.557) (0.026) (0.550) 
       Time controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household income dummies? No No No No Yes Yes 
       Outcome variable Health satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Covariates       
Received tax rebatea 0.041*** 0.139 0.025** 0.079 0.017 0.091 
 (0.011) (0.218) (0.011) (0.224) (0.011) (0.221) 
       Time controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographics? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household income dummies? No No No No Yes Yes 
       IV F-statisticb 30.51  28.02  28.24 
       Observations 10,393 10,393 10,393 10,393 10,393 10,393 
NOTE: Universe: Imputed individual-equivalent gross monthly income of less than $6,000, April 27–May 31, 2008. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1).  
a. Each column labeled OLS shows the estimate of δ from Equation (1), and each column labeled 2SLS shows the estimate of 
δ from Equation (2). All of the regressions control for day-of-week dummies and a linear and squared weekly trend. Selected 
regressions control for demographics listed in the notes to Table 3 and monthly household gross income dummies.  
b. The instrumental variable, DTS, is the amount of cumulative tax rebate payments issued by the U.S. Treasury up to a given 





Table 7  Estimated Effects of Tax Rebate Receipt on Components of Daily Affect in April and May 
   
Regression controls for income? 
Outcome variable Method  No
a  Yes
b 
















































































 NOTE: Universe: Imputed individual-equivalent gross monthly income of less than $6,000; April 27–May 31, 2008. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1). 
a. Each row labeled OLS shows the estimate of δ from Equation (1), and each row labeled 2SLS shows the estimate of δ from 
Equation (2). All of the regressions control for day-of-week dummies and a linear and squared weekly trend. All of the 
regressions control for demographics listed in the notes to Table 3.  
b. Same as a., but regressions also control for monthly household gross income dummies.  
c. The instrumental variable, DTS, is the amount of cumulative tax rebate payments issued by the U.S. Treasury up to a given 





Table 8  Robustness Checks: 2SLS Effects of Tax Rebate Receipt on Subjective Well-Being Using Different 
Sample Cuts 
Outcome variable  Life satisfaction Net affect Health satisfaction Sample restrictions: income — keep if respondent’s… 


















Sample restrictions: other characteristics — keep if the respondent… 
C. Has children  
 
0.595 0.618 -0.058 
  
(0.464) (0.473) (0.179) 
  
[24.97] [24.97] [24.97] 
D. Does not have children 
 
0.221 0.714 0.339 
  
(0.502) (0.508) (0.220) 
  
[23.56] [23.56] [23.56] 
E. Is white 
 
0.073 0.631* 0.081 
  
(0.342) (0.356) (0.145) 
  
[43.88] [43.88] [43.88] 
F. Is not white 
 
1.875 0.325 0.804 
  
(1.829) (1.487) (0.728) 
  
[3.383] [3.383] [3.383] 
G. Is married 
 
0.307 0.332 0.186 
  
(0.320) (0.313) (0.135) 
  
[45.57] [45.57] [45.57] 
H. Is not married 
 
0.301 1.456 0.104 
  
(0.951) (1.071) (0.391) 
  
[7.781] [7.781] [7.781] 
I. Has at least some college 
 
0.121 0.712* 0.099 
  
(0.359) (0.392) (0.157) 
  
[34.96] [34.96] [34.96] 
J. Does not have any college 
 
0.838 0.367 0.325 
  
(0.853) (0.777) (0.330) 
  
[11.42] [11.42] [11.42] 
K. Is younger than 35 years 
 
−0.173 0.488 0.267 
  
(0.525) (0.557) (0.192) 
  
[16.71] [16.71] [16.71] 
L. Is 35 years or older 
 
0.532 0.732* 0.153 
  
(0.430) (0.432) (0.179) 
  
[32.99] [32.99] [32.99] 
M. Is a woman 0.611 0.637 -0.023 
  (0.466) (0.468) (0.190) 
  [28.54] [28.54] [28.54] 
N. Is a man  -0.114 0.647 0.457* 
  (0.565) (0.568) (0.250) 
  [16.71] [16.71] [16.71] 
NOTE: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1) and instrumental variable F-statistics are 
in brackets.  
Each cell corresponds to a different regression and shows a 2SLS estimate of δ from Equation (2). All of the regressions control 
for day-of-week dummies, a linear and squared weekly trend, demographics listed in the notes to Table 3, and monthly household 
gross income dummies. Each row includes a different analysis sample. Rows A and B define the sample using different imputed 
individual-equivalent monthly gross income cutoffs. Rows C–N define the sample based on selected respondent characteristics. 
The instrument, DTS, is the amount of cumulative tax rebate payments issued by the U.S. Treasury up to a given day, divided by 
all tax rebate payments made in 2008.  




Table 9  Robustness Checks: 2SLS Effects of Tax Rebate Receipt on Net Affect Using Sample Cuts by Income and Respondent Characteristics  






children Is white 
Is not 
white Is married 
Is not 
married 









 Is 35 years 
or older Is a woman Is a man 
PANEL A: Keep if respondent’s monthly gross incomea < $2,000 
Received tax rebate 2.837* 2.215 2.329** 2.179 0.785 9.673 1.844* 2.652 1.826* 2.941 3.045* 1.437 
 
(1.486) (1.453) (1.074) (3.879) (0.554) (13.478) (1.035) (2.008) (1.004) (1.851) (1.791) (1.220) 
IV F-statisticb [5.99] [5.12] [9.37] [0.832] [17.22] [0.538] [8.26] [3.32] [8.59] [4.22] [4.68] [5.34] 
PANEL B: Keep if respondent’s monthly gross incomea ≥ $2,000 
Received tax rebate −0.451 −0.004 −0.118 −0.454 0.129 −0.583 0.219 −1.324 −0.817 0.052 −0.440 0.102 
 (0.591) (0.552) (0.409) (1.511) (0.417) (0.908) (0.452) (0.988) (0.887) (0.432) (0.523) (0.670) 
IV F-statisticb [16.83] [18.88] [33.69] [2.841] [27.72] [9.351] [26.45] [8.644] [7.327] [31.37] [23.30] [11.52] 
NOTE: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1). Each cell corresponds to a different regression and shows a 2SLS estimate of δ from 
Equation (2). The dependent variable is net affect. All of the regressions control for day-of-week dummies, a linear and squared weekly trend, and demographics listed in the notes 
to Table 3, including monthly household gross income dummies. Each column restricts the sample based on respondent characteristics. Panels A and B define the sample using a 
different imputed individual-equivalent monthly gross income cutoff.  
a. “Gross monthly income” refers to the imputed individual-equivalent gross monthly income; see the text for details.  
b. The instrumental variable, DTS, is the amount of cumulative tax rebate payments issued by the U.S. Treasury up to a given day, divided by all tax rebate payments made in 
2008. The F-test statistic is from an F-test of weak identification. 
52 
 
Figure 1  Disbursement of the 2008 Tax Rebates  
 



























Figure 2  Fraction of Tax Rebate Recipients in the Gallup-Healthways Daily Poll and Daily Treasury 
Statements (DTS) 
 
NOTE: Universe for the Gallup series consist of respondents with imputed individual-equivalent gross monthly income of less 
than $6,000; April 27–July 1 and July 21–23, 2008. The DTS time series is computed by dividing the cumulative number of $ 
millions of payments made by a given date by the $92.185 billion in total payments made by August 31, 2008. Note that the 













Figure 3  Measures of Subjective Well-Being in 2008 and 2011 
 
 
  2008      2011 
 
PANEL A: Life Satisfaction 
 
 
PANEL B: Net Affect 
  
 
PANEL C: Health Satisfaction in 2008  
 
 
NOTE: Universe consists of all GHDP respondents. Each panel shows 14-day moving averages. For 2008, the shaded area 
denotes the period when the GHDP question on tax rebates was asked (April 27–July 23). For 2011, the shaded area denotes the 
same period. Life satisfaction is measured on an 11-point scale from zero to 10. Net affect is calculated as the average positive 












































































Figure 4  Measures of Subjective Well-Being in April, May, and June, by Tax Rebate Recipiency 
 
 
PANEL A: Life Satisfaction 
 
PANEL B: Net Affect 
 
PANEL C: Health Satisfaction 
 
 
NOTE: Universe consists of GHDP tax rebate recipients and nonrecipients with imputed individual-equivalent gross monthly 
income of less than $6,000. Each panel shows 14-day moving averages. The first dashed vertical line marks May 2, 2008, which 
is the first date for receipt of the tax rebate as a deposit. The second dashed vertical line marks May 16, 2008, which is the first 
date for tax rebate receipt as a check.   
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Figure 5  P-values from Falsification Tests 
 
 
NOTE: Universe: Imputed individual-equivalent gross monthly income of less than $6,000; April 27–July 1; July 21–23, 2008. 
The figure shows the distribution of p-values of estimated δ-coefficients from 72 2SLS regressions that use the predetermined 
variables from Table 2 and the state that the respondent lives in as false outcomes; see the text for details. The mean p-value 
equals 0.49, and the median p-value equals 0.48. All of the regressions control for day-of-week dummies and a linear and squared 
weekly trend. The vertical dashed lines correspond to the p-values associated with the 2SLS δ-coefficients in Table 3, column 











p = 0.404 
p = 0.082 














Figure 6  Distribution of Coefficients from Randomized Placebo Tests 
 
PANEL A: Life Satisfaction  
   2008      2011 
   
PANEL B: Net Affect 
   2008      2011 
  
PANEL C: Health Satisfaction in 2008 
 
NOTE: Universe: Imputed individual-equivalent gross monthly income of less than $6,000, April 27–July 1, 2008; July 21–23, 
2008; April 27–July 1, 2011; and July 21–23, 2011. Each figure shows the distribution of estimated coefficients from 1,000 
randomly assigned tax rebate receipt indicators for years 2008 and 2011. For each outcome, the estimated model corresponds to 
the OLS regression in Table 4, Panel A, row A. The vertical dashed line corresponds to the relevant point estimate from the 








































































Table A1  Fraction of Tax Rebate Recipients in the 2008 GHDP 
Date Received tax rebate?  Date Received tax rebate? April 27 0.026 
 
continued 
April 28 0.021 
 
June 11 0.583 
April 29 0.020 
 
June 12 0.545 
April 30 0.029 
 
June 13 0.471 
May 1 0.038 
 
June 14 0.498 
May 2 0.057 
 
June 15 0.493 
May 3 0.052 
 
June 16 0.517 
May 4 0.077 
 
June 17 0.571 
May 5 0.083 
 
June 18  May 6 0.061 
 
June 19 0.539 
May 7 0.097 
 
June 20 0.574 
May 8 0.092 
 
June 21 0.549 
May 9 0.144 
 
June 22 0.561 
May 10 0.167 
 
June 23 0.562 
May 11 0.169 
 
June 24 0.557 
May 12 0.223 
 
June 25 0.639 
May 13 0.270 
 
June 26 0.537 
May 14 0.222 
 
June 27  May 15 0.234 
 
June 28 0.556 
May 16 0.257 
 
June 29 0.608 
May 17 0.294 
 
June 30 0.651 
May 18 0.289 
 
July 1 0.674 
May 19 0.373 
 
July 2  May 20 0.388 
 
July 3  May 21 0.286 
 
July 4  May 22 0.311 
 
July 5  May 23 0.432 
 
July 6  May 24 0.326 
 
July 7  May 25 0.365 
 
July 8  May 27 0.400 
 
July 9  May 28 0.394 
 
July 10  May 29 0.415 
 
July 11  May 30   
July 12  May 31 0.355 
 
July 13  June 1 0.409 
 
July 14  June 2 0.426 
 
July 15  June 3 0.386 
 
July 16  June 4 0.447 
 
July 17  June 5 0.368 
 
July 18  June 6 0.492 
 
July 19  June 7 0.405 
 
July 20  June 8 0.364 
 
July 21 0.747 
June 9 0.505 
 
July 22 0.807 
June 10 0.488 
 
July 23 0.767 
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       Instrumental variable, DTSa 0.518*** 0.528*** 0.527*** 0.565*** 0.539*** 0.540*** 
 




























































































Highest completed level of education 













































Days of week 
       Monday 0.029*** 0.027** 0.025** 0.012 0.010 0.009 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Tuesday 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.022 0.016 0.015 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Wednesday 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.002 −0.005 −0.005 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Thursday 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 −0.003 −0.003 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Friday −0.001 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.008 −0.009 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
 





















      Saturday −0.014 −0.011 −0.011 −0.024* −0.022* −0.022* 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Time trends 
       Week 0.018 0.015 0.015 −0.032 −0.025 −0.026 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Week squared  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Gross monthly household income 































































State dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
       Constant −0.030* −0.550*** −0.581*** 0.046* −0.247*** −0.265*** 
 
(0.017) (0.077) (0.097) (0.024) (0.084) (0.103) 
      IV F-statistic 42.24 45.24 45.23 30.51 28.02 28.24 
Observations 17,933 17,933 17,933 10,393 10,393 10,393 
NOTE: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1).  
a. The instrumental variable, DTS, is the amount of cumulative tax rebate payments issued by the U.S. Treasury up to a given 
day, divided by all tax rebate payments made in 2008. 
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